HMML
HyperMedia Markup Language
A tiny open format for one file that is HTML and its images - together, in bytes.
image + html → one binary document
It's bits & bytes and a contract. Markup stays text; images stay raw (no base64). Smaller than a self‑contained HTML file, and it renders with the full power of a browser.
~2 KB gzipped reader · sub‑millisecond decode · zero dependencies · works in the browser, Node, Deno, Bun & workers
Spec · Playground · Quick start · Why
The idea
A web page is already hypermedia - text, layout, and media in one experience. But the moment you want it as one portable file, you hit a wall: you base64 every image into the HTML and pay a ~33% size tax, or you ship a folder of loose assets.
HMML is the third option. One binary document:
┌─────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ HMML document │
│ │
│ MARK <html>…</html> ← text, gzipped │
│ RSRC image/webp ▒▒▒▒▒ ← raw bytes │
│ RSRC image/png ▒▒▒▒▒ ← raw bytes │
│ META { title, … } │
│ │
│ markup points at images with hmml:<id> │
└─────────────────────────────────────────────┘
The markup references each image by a tiny token (<img src="hmml:r0">), and the bytes
live next to it - uncompressed‑duplicated, exactly as the camera/encoder produced them.
Because the renderer is a real browser, your layout has no limits: matrix3d,
filters, blend modes, SVG, <canvas>, CSS grid - all of it, for free.
Why HMML
- Smaller than base64. Raw image bytes drop the
33% base64 tax; markup is gzipped. Measured **25% smaller** than the equivalent single‑file HTML on image‑heavy docs, and 35–40% smaller on markup‑heavy ones. - Tiny & fast clients. The reader is ~2 KB gzipped and decodes at ~800 MB/s.
- Zero dependencies. Pure
Uint8Array; compression uses the platformCompressionStream. Runs unchanged in browsers, Node 18+, Deno, Bun and Web Workers. - A real contract, not a blob. A PNG‑style signature + self‑describing chunks + optional CRC32. Forward‑compatible: unknown chunks are skipped, so v2 won't break v1.
- Render however you like. Resolve images to
blob:object URLs (cheap to paint),data:URIs (self‑contained export), or keephmml:refs and serve them yourself. - Safe by default.
mount()ships trust tiers: no‑JS Shadow DOM for the common case, or jail untrusted JS in a sandboxed iframe (no parent DOM, no cookies, no network). The renderer is a separate import - the core reader carries none of it. See Security.
Numbers
Measured on this repo (npm run size, npm run bench; Node 20, single‑threaded).
Bundle size - minified, by what you import:
| You import | gzip | brotli |
|---|---|---|
decode (the reader) |
2.0 KB | 1.8 KB |
encode + extract (the writer) |
2.0 KB | 1.8 KB |
pack + unpack (typical app) |
3.2 KB | 2.9 KB |
| everything | 3.8 KB | 3.4 KB |
Throughput - a 494 KB document (one ~492 KB image + markup):
| Operation | per call | throughput |
|---|---|---|
| decode (gzip) | 0.61 ms | 829 MB/s |
| encode (gzip) | 1.17 ms | 434 MB/s |
| decode (store, no compression) | 0.06 ms | 8.0 GB/s |
| encode (store) | 0.36 ms | 1.4 GB/s |
And it was 25.2% smaller than the self‑contained base64 HTML of the same content.
Quick start
npm install @eddocu/hmml
The easy path - pack / unpack:
import { pack, unpack } from "@eddocu/hmml";
// Pass HTML that has data: URIs - they're auto-extracted into raw resources.
// (gzip by default → smallest file, no config.)
const bytes: Uint8Array = await pack(`
<section style="transform: matrix3d(1,0,0,0, 0,1,0,0, 0,0,1,0, 0,0,0,1)">
<img src="…">
</section>
`, { meta: { title: "Card" } });
// …store/send `bytes` (a .hmml file)…
const doc = await unpack(bytes);
el.innerHTML = doc.toHTML(); // images inlined as data URIs
// or, cheaper to paint in the browser:
const { html, revoke } = doc.createObjectUrls();
el.innerHTML = html; // images as blob: URLs - call revoke() on teardown
Building a document explicitly (no auto‑extract):
await pack({
html: `<img src="hmml:hero">`,
resources: [{ id: "hero", mime: "image/png", data: pngBytes }],
});
Use it from a plain <script> via CDN - exposes window.HMML (~3.7 KB gzip):
<script src="https://unpkg.com/@eddocu/hmml/dist/index.global.js"></script>
<script>
const doc = await HMML.unpack(new Uint8Array(await file.arrayBuffer()));
document.body.innerHTML = doc.toHTML();
</script>
For the smallest payload, inline a decode-only build (~2 KB gzip) - that's what the landing page does.
Security
A .hmml can carry arbitrary HTML, CSS and JS. unpack hands you the markup + the
raw bytes; how you mount it is your security boundary. The optional
@eddocu/hmml/mount helper (a separate ~1.7 KB import - the core reader stays ~2 KB)
makes the safe choice the default.
The principle: you can't sanitise arbitrary JS into safety - you confine it.
Only a sandboxed iframe confines JS. Shadow DOM isolates styles + the DOM tree (it fixes
class-name collisions) but a <script> in a shadow root runs in your page with full
access. So mount picks the isolation primitive per trust tier:
trust |
primitive | JS | what it stops |
|---|---|---|---|
static (default) |
Shadow DOM + sanitiser | ✗ stripped | scripts removed; CSS can't leak in or out |
sandbox |
iframe allow-scripts¹ + CSP |
✓ jailed | opaque origin → no parent DOM, no host cookies/storage; connect-src 'none' → no network |
isolated |
sandbox on a separate origin |
✓ jailed hard | all of the above, across an origin/process boundary |
¹ deliberately without allow-same-origin - combining the two re-grants your origin and voids the sandbox.
import { unpack } from "@eddocu/hmml";
import { mount } from "@eddocu/hmml/mount";
const doc = await unpack(bytes);
mount(el, doc); // secure by default — scripts never run
mount(el, doc, { trust: "sandbox" }); // JS runs, jailed: no parent DOM, no network
mount(el, doc, { trust: "isolated", origin: "https://sandbox.example.com" });
What each tier does — and doesn't
staticsanitises with the browser's nativeElement.setHTML()(zero bytes shipped). Where that isn't available yet, pass your own -{ sanitizer: DOMPurify.sanitize }- or it transparently falls back tosandbox; it never injects unsanitised markup into your page. Caveats: a sanitiser may drop exotic/unknown elements, andstatichas no CSP, so it does not block externalurl()in CSS - it stops scripts, not network/privacy beacons. For content that's untrusted and must stay offline, usesandbox.sandboxruns JS in an opaque origin under a strict CSP: no parent DOM, no cookies/storage, no network. Residual risk is CPU/RAM (a hostile file can still spin the iframe's own thread) - gate it withloading="lazy"/visibility and dispose it when offscreen. Jailed content can't measure itself, so setheight.postMessageout is allowed (a channel, not a leak of your data).isolatedissandboxloaded from an origin you host - ship the loader fromcreateSandboxLoaderHtml()and serve it with a strong CSP response header. Use it for hostile content or defence-in-depth against sandbox-bypass bugs.
Format-level concerns
- Integrity ≠ authenticity. The optional CRC32 catches corruption, not tampering; there is no
signature yet, so don't infer provenance from a
.hmml. (A signedSIGNchunk is planned, to let you trust-gate scripts by author.) - Resources are stored verbatim. Raster bytes behind an
<img>are inert, but an SVG pulled inline, or<object>/<use>to external refs, can carry script - which is exactly why you render through a trust tier instead of dropping markup into your live DOM. toHTML()/createObjectUrls()are resolvers, not sanitisers. They re-stitch the document; they don't make it safe. Pair them withmount(or your own sandboxed iframe) for anything you didn't author yourself.
How it works (the contract)
A document is a signature + a stream of self‑describing chunks:
89 'H' 'M' 'M' 'L' 0D 0A 1A 0A signature (PNG-style corruption guard)
major · minor · codec 1 byte each
─ chunk ─ … ─ chunk ─ TYPE(4) FLAGS(1) LEN(u32 LE) PAYLOAD [CRC32?]
MARK markup (gzip-able)
RSRC id + mime + raw bytes
META JSON metadata
ENDF end marker
Little‑endian, UTF‑8, one codec per file (recorded in the header so the reader auto‑resolves it). Full byte‑level details, including a hex worked example, are in SPEC.md.
How it compares
| binary | images stored | one file | renders as | to read it | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| HMML | ✅ | raw | ✅ | HTML, any browser | ~2 KB lib |
Single‑file HTML (data: URIs) |
❌ text | base64 (+33%) | ✅ | HTML | nothing |
MHTML .mht |
❌ MIME text | base64 | ✅ | HTML | a parser |
Safari .webarchive |
✅ bplist | raw | ✅ | HTML (Safari only) | Apple‑only |
Web Bundle .wbn |
✅ CBOR | raw | ✅ | HTTP exchanges | CBOR + flagged browser |
| ZIP (EPUB‑style) | ✅ | raw | ✅ | depends | a zip lib |
HMML's niche: a small, embeddable, smaller‑than‑base64, dependency‑free binary document you fully control - ideal for storing a rich snippet/card compactly and rehydrating it in the browser. (For archiving whole pages, MHTML or a ZIP are fine; this is a different job.)
Playground
Real files and pages to poke - see playground/.
npm run playground # build + generate + serve a gallery at http://127.0.0.1:5188
npm run pg:bundle # zip a self-contained, file://-openable bundle (no server/npm)
- Viewer - drag a
.hmmlin and watch it render (works fromfile://). - Create - pick images, build & download your own
.hmml. - Every sample also ships as a double‑clickable standalone
.html.
Compression codecs
Default for pack is gzip; for the low‑level encode it's store (no deps at all).
Built‑in ids are auto‑resolved on decode.
import { encode, gzipCodec, storeCodec, deflateRawCodec } from "@eddocu/hmml";
await encode(input, { codec: gzipCodec }); // smallest
await encode(input, { codec: storeCodec, crc: true }); // no compression + integrity
Custom codec (e.g. fflate for old runtimes):
import { deflateSync, inflateSync } from "fflate";
const fflateCodec = { id: 16, deflate: deflateSync, inflate: inflateSync };
await encode(input, { codec: fflateCodec });
await decode(file, { codec: fflateCodec }); // custom id → pass it back
API
The package is module-based and side-effect-free ("sideEffects": false), so bundlers
tree-shake to exactly what you import. Two entry points keep the renderer out of the reader:
@eddocu/hmml - the core (read/write, no DOM):
| Export | What it does |
|---|---|
pack(html | input, opts?) |
One‑call encode (auto‑extracts data: URIs; gzip default) |
unpack(bytes, opts?) |
One‑call decode → HmmlDocument |
encode / decode |
Low‑level encode/decode |
extract / inlineDataUris / inlineObjectUrls |
Markup ⇄ resources helpers |
storeCodec / gzipCodec / deflateRawCodec / deflateCodec |
Built‑in codecs |
sniffMime / extensionFor / toBase64 / fromBase64 / crc32 |
Utilities |
HmmlDocument: { html, resources: Map, meta, codecId, toHTML(), createObjectUrls() }.
@eddocu/hmml/mount - the optional DOM renderer (~1.7 KB; pulls in zero of it unless you import it):
| Export | What it does |
|---|---|
mount(el, doc, opts?) |
Render into el under a trust tier (static | sandbox | isolated); returns { trust, element, dispose() } |
createSandboxLoaderHtml() |
Loader page to host on a separate origin for trust: "isolated" |
DEFAULT_CSP |
The CSP applied inside sandbox/isolated frames |
See Security for the trust tiers and their guarantees.
Development
npm install
npm run demo # node round-trip + size comparison
npm test # vitest unit tests
npm run test:browser # Playwright: decode & render in real Chromium
npm run bench # encode/decode throughput
npm run size # bundle sizes by import shape
npm run build # dual ESM/CJS + IIFE global + .d.ts (minified) via tsup
Status
v0 / draft. The format (major version 1) is implemented and tested end‑to‑end
(unit + real-Chromium Playwright, including the mount trust tiers), but the spec may
still evolve before a 1.0 tag. On the roadmap: more media MIME sniffing (video/audio)
with lazy resolution, a worker decode path, and a signed SIGN chunk for authenticity.
Feedback and breakage reports welcome.
License
MIT © Argun